Trust

Security

Every claim below is a mechanism, not an intention — because “we take security seriously” is what every company says the week before it doesn’t.

Last updated 14 October 2026

Staff cannot read your location

It is enforced by the database, not by a rule staff follow.
Support and administration connect through a Postgres role with no grant on the location tables. A staff member who ran the query would get a permission error, not a result. There is no “admin view” of a family map because there is nothing to build it from.

This is the difference that matters. Almost every product in this category has an internal tool that can see any customer's data, guarded by a policy and an access log. A policy is a promise; a missing grant is a fact.

Every look is written down

Looks at your location are recorded, hour by hour, where you can read them.
When somebody in your circle opens your location on the map or on your card, that hour is recorded against their name in Who checked on me. The record is kept for 120 days, and only you, the person looked at, can clear it early.
The audit log is append-only and hash-chained.
Sign-ins, removals, permission changes and requests for a fresh location go in a separate audit log. Each entry includes a hash of the one before it, so removing or editing an entry breaks the chain and is detectable.

It covers looks by your own family. If somebody in your circle opened your location at 2am, you can see that they looked in that hour, and this was a deliberate choice: the person most likely to misuse a family tracker is in the family.

How the data is protected

In transit
TLS on every connection between your phone or browser and our servers, with certificate verification never disabled.
At rest
Stored on our servers in Brisbane. Copies of the databases go off the server to Cloudflare R2 every hour and every night, and every copy is encrypted on our server before it leaves, with a key that is not kept on the server. Restoring them has been done by hand to prove it works. Hourly copies are deleted after 3 days and nightly copies after 35.
A backup nobody has restored is a belief, not a backup.
On your phone
Sign-in tokens live in the Keychain on iOS and EncryptedSharedPreferences on Android, never in ordinary app storage.
Row-level isolation
Postgres row-level security is on for the tables that hold family data, so a query that forgets a WHERE clause returns nothing rather than everything.

Accounts and sessions

Passwords
Hashed with a modern memory-hard algorithm. We never see or store the password itself.
Token theft
Sign-in tokens rotate on every use. If an old one is used again — the signature of a stolen token — every session descended from that token is ended immediately, the thief's included. A phone that simply lost the answer to its last refresh, moments before, is not treated as a thief.
Two-factor
Available, including passkeys, which cannot be phished.
Sessions you can end
Every device signed into your account is listed, with its model and when it was last seen, and any of them can be ended from any other.
Rate limiting
Sign-in attempts are limited per network, and a limit reached says so rather than reporting a wrong password.

Dependencies

Packages are installed with install scripts switched off, and each one is checked against the checksum recorded in the lockfile. The checks that run on every proposed change also require every lockfile entry to carry a checksum, and fail on a known High or Critical vulnerability unless we have recorded an exception with an owner and an expiry no more than 30 days away. The job that builds the release images does not yet wait for those checks to pass. Checking how widely used a package is and whether its publisher changed recently is done by hand when a package is added, with a script we run ourselves; it is not yet part of every build.

The API takes its settings and secrets before any outside package loads, removes them from its environment, and hands each part of the code only the values it uses. Most secrets reach it as read-only files rather than environment variables. That narrows what a compromised package could pick up, but it does not stop code running inside the API from reading those files: holding secrets in a separate process is not built.

What we have not done yet

Orbities has not been through an external penetration test or a formal certification such as SOC 2 or ISO 27001. Saying so is more useful than a badge: if you are choosing between products on this basis, you now know where we are.

Reporting a problem

Write to [email protected] with enough detail to reproduce it. We will acknowledge within two business days and tell you what we are doing.

We will not pursue anybody who reports a flaw in good faith, does not access data belonging to other people, and gives us a reasonable chance to fix it before publishing.